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Abstract: Sets out a system of corporate governance regulation, aimed
at combining legal and social methods of governing director behaviour
and at creating a framework flexible enough to accommodate different
business and ethical cultures. Outlines the theoretical basis of cor-
porate governance and the broad responsibilities of directors, and
discusses the extent to which they can and should be regulated. Dis-
cusses the constitution of a regulatory framework encompassing law,
soft law and best practice, and ethics.
*355 This article will critically analyse the conventional wisdom in the
"pyramid of business rules" with regard to company directors (including hard
and soft laws), arguing that the emphasis on amending or refining legal instru-
ments might not be effective. Even though there are several factors as to why
these rules do not appear to yield the desired results, the key is perhaps to
align them with widely accepted non-legal broad-base ethical guidelines that
support the spirit of the law. The idea is that if company directors could in-
ternalise these ethical principles, there might be fewer corporate collapses
and scandals driven by greed.
Introduction
Corporate governance is a topical subject-matter, and like any fashionable
concept it can be easily misconstrued. Governance tends to be in the headlines
amid economic crises; much of the discussions have centred upon corporate scan-
dals or failures. Leaving aside the many claims of what corporate governance
can do, in essence governance has to do with control. Those who govern
(directors) are bestowed with the power and ability to control the resource of
the company, and should thus be held accountable for their actions/inactions as
well as decisions/indecisions.
In the last two decades, the debate about how to improve corporate gov-
ernance and directors' accountability have received much attention from govern-
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ments, scholars, investors, accountants, lawyers, NGOs and business associ-
ations, just to name a few. A series of measures usually follows. They range
from laws, listing rules and codes to guidelines and best practices. Despite
the myriad of measures, corporate scandals and failures do not appear to be
abating.
This article is not going to devise or create any new measures or make any
groundbreaking statements. Rather the intent is to adopt a multi-level approach
using a regulatory pyramid combining legal and non-legal measures to regulate
directors. The approach is socio-legal, taking into consideration contextual
factors that shape regulatory strategies by examining a range of quasi-legal
and non-legal regulatory instruments. The aim is to foster better regulatory
compliance by aligning core legal obligations with social norms and ethical
principles in a structured framework. Furthermore, the article maintains two
criteria as constants. The first is to ensure that all regulatory measures
[FN1] including ethical principles should reinforce the law and the objectives
of the law. The law should always be the centre of corporate governance and
directors' duties regulation. The second is flexibility and diversity. Flexib-
ility allows greater stakeholder participation and market expectations to be
incorporated. In terms of diversity, the idea is to permit countries with dif-
ferent cultural and ethical value systems to be taken into account so as to
strengthen individual commitment towards complying with the objectives of the
law. In short, this is an attempt to conceptualise a broad and integrative
framework to regulate company directors.
Debate about corporate governance
Deconstructing the elements of corporate governance
Corporate governance can be defined as how a company is directed and
steered, [FN2] or broadly characterised as a system of checks and balances to
ensure that decision makers are accountable to stakeholders. [FN3] There are
many theories. Some of the more commonly referred to theories are: agency,
stakeholders, stewardship, managerial hegemony and resource dependency, [FN4]
out of which the two most cited theories are agency and stakeholders.
The agency theory presumes that ownership and control of the corporation are
separate. This is rooted in the notion that a company is a separate entity.
[FN5] The shareholders are investors providing capital and receiving dividends,
while the board of directors is left in charge of the affairs of the company
and overseeing the managers for a fee or remuneration. Therefore these share-
holders would incur cost in monitoring managers, whereas the stakeholders argue
that apart from shareholders, managers and board of directors, others like
creditors, debt financiers, analysts, auditors *356 and corporate regulators
should be incorporated into the governance structure. This approach tends to
blur the "lines" of accountability when executives have a clear chain of com-
mand to answer to because of the balancing act they have to carry out between
various parties. [FN6] On the debate of which model is superior, Letza, Sun and
Kirkbride assert:
"... [B]oth shareholder and stakeholder perspectives claim superiority of
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their models respectively; however, in reality we have seen a dynamic shift
with both models becoming mutually attractive all over the world in the last
two decades ... [A]ll this implies that the so-called superiority and prior-
ity of any model is not permanent and universal, but rather temporary and
contextual." [FN7]
Pettigrew claimed that corporate governance research lacks coherence empiric-
ally, methodologically or theoretically. [FN8] The theories merely attest to
the complexities in governing a corporation, thus there is no definitive or
"one size fits all" model. Reality might well mean that there is an intermixing
of theories integrating into a multifaceted paradigm. Consequently, corporate
governance is a multi-dimensional issue, [FN9] which could help explain why
many governance measures have been articulated as principles. Furthermore, re-
gardless of which theories one subscribes to, the accountability of the board
of directors is a cornerstone of effective governance. Therefore improving ac-
countability of the board as a whole, as well as the individual director, is
crucial.
Besides the notion that corporate governance would converge over time as
markets integrate under the auspices of globalisation, these arguments rest on
the notion that economic forces would lead markets to integrate and barriers
like regulatory differences would erode eventually and harmonisation would oc-
cur. Some international law academics also argued that the widespread trans-
plantation of laws would eventually produce to some level of convergence. Nev-
ertheless, historical developments and other local circumstances could be
proven a barrier in the convergence debate. Thus, corporate governance consists
of both common and varied characteristics.
In view of the demands on modern boards, ranging from many foreseeable to
unforeseeable challenges, carrying out daily tasks is made more complex. Al-
though this does not constitute an excuse or limit board or fellow directors'
scope of responsibilities, it meant that effective governance calls for greater
vigilance, as well as the need to be responsive to the global market shifts.
Hence, to improve board accountability, it is first important to identify what
the board does. Given the array of board responsibilities, dividing their tasks
along functional lines would permit greater clarity on the allocation of du-
ties, obligations and liabilities. After a survey of management and organisa-
tional books on company directors, one could broadly "pigeonhole" the duties
into three functions: "structural", "operational", and "relational" (see Figure
1). [FN10]
The structural elements are concerned with board structure and processes,
which are easily identifiable. Getting it right will depend on a host of in-
ternal and external factors. Some are straightforward; others can be more prob-
lematic. In essence, the structural aspect of governance is about due process
and a system of checks and balances. For example, on board committees, Carter
and Lorsh write:
"The rationale for establishing board committees is to divide up the work
among board members so that they can accomplish more in their limited time.
Committees allow directors to develop specialized understanding and to delve
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more deeply into specific issues." [FN11]
Operational considerations consist of strategy formulation, policymaking, mon-
itoring and supervising management, and risk assessment. [FN12] Since opera-
tional matters are made up of matters that are objectively determined as well
as value judgments that are subjectively chosen, directors' personal experi-
ences are crucial in decision-making. Hence diligence is crucial. As for super-
vision, vigilance is paramount. While best practices guides could help with the
development of better policies and protocols, many operational matters are in-
volve subjective judgments drawn from directors' experiences and business acu-
men. [FN13]
Relational issues are matters to do with people. Dealing with people is not
straightforward; it is interactive and dynamic, which includes matters like
leadership, corporate social responsibility, stakeholder communications and re-
lationship management. Since human relations are by nature more complex and
challenging, there are universal templates or solutions available. A good prac-
tice would be
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
*357 to actively engage with various stakeholders and address their concerns.
Besides, changing circumstances or personal interest could tempt directors to
adopt creative ways to bypass regulatory and procedural safeguards. This sug-
gests that the governing and managing relationships are challenging and dynam-
ic. [FN14] Therefore values, especially ethical values and social norms, could
influence how relational matters are dissimilar across companies and countries.
Consequently, to improve the accountability of directors by developing ro-
bust rules and best practices to address the three aspects of board functions
would, in theory, enhance corporate governance. Two questions emerge: first,
should the law regulate all aspects of board functions, and secondly, can the
law regulate these functions adequately? The short answer is--yes and no.
"Yes", concerning the general duties of directors: these duties are broad in
scope, specific in how the law defines those duties. So the law can regulate
directors by ensure "they do their work" and decide and act in the interest of
the company. "No", here, refers to certain limitations of the law. The law as a
regulatory tool cannot micro-manage every aspect of board functions. Besides,
the law should not and cannot replace good governance practices nor can it reg-
ulate all three aspects of board functions. Concisely, the law cannot preside
over all the affairs of the board and governance. Therefore, apart from legal
obligations, quasi-legal and non-legal regulatory instruments could be con-
sidered as complementary or supporting mechanisms to enhance the accountability
of directors.
In many countries, the law regulates director by imposing a series of du-
ties. Some countries employ statutes to regulate; for example in the United
Kingdom, the Companies Act regulates directors' duties. In jurisdictions like
in Hong Kong, general law duties apply. Others, like Australia, draw on both
general law and statutes to regulate. Even though each jurisdiction differs in
approach, the scope of duties is somewhat similar. Austin, Ford and Ramsay ar-
gue that:
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"The main function of directors' duties is to ensure the loyalty of dir-
ectors to their company. The existence of the duties is a recognition that
the interests of directors may diverge from those shareholders." [FN15]
According to Farrar, "[t]he law only provides a basic framework of procedure
and accountability". [FN16] Thus there is a need to supplement the law with "hy-
brids" (co-regulation) and "soft laws" (enforced self-regulation). These con-
sist of rules, codes and standards, which are regulatory in nature since there
are statutory consequences if breached, or are voluntary in name because market
credibility requires compliance. [FN17] Much of the contents these hybrid and
soft laws focus on improving better processes and structures. [FN18] However,
corporate collapses continue to mount. This suggest that co-regulatory and mar-
ket based regulatory mechanisms have limitations too.
Regulating corporate governance
Recent spectacular corporate collapses and scandals in many parts of the
world, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, as well as the most recent global
financial crisis in 2008, triggered market hysteria about misgivings in corpor-
ate governance regulations. [FN19] These events compelled governments across
the world to enact new legislations or create quasi-legislative (soft law) in-
struments. Stock exchanges and business associations have also followed suit
with a series of additional codes or best practices; some are compulsory while
others are voluntary. These laws and codes tended to be reactive at best, and
were hastily implemented, because these instruments did not seem to abate the
number of corporate failures and scandals due to bad corporate governance.
[FN20]
While the reasons that cause corporate failures are varied, Sykes found some
common "tell tale signs" in over two centuries of major corporate collapses in
Australia. They were creative accounting, excessive risk and speculation,
overzealous business expectations, diminishing margins and adverse political/
economic conditions (domestic and international). [FN21] What had changed over
time? Clearly, the context had altered, with the rapid pace of change in do-
mestic and international business environment driven predominantly by technolo-
gical progress, financial innovations, overzealous expectations, socio-economic
transformation and political changes, all of which lured directors, executives
and entrepreneurs to "push the envelope" and "raise the stakes of the game",
[FN22] leaving behind regulators and plaintiffs (victims) to pursue corporate
executives through the courts in search of justice; hence achieving accountab-
ility through litigation is an "ex post". This form of regulation might be too
late because it usually happens in the aftermath of corporate collapses. [FN23]
The OECD re-emphasised the importance of corporate governance amid the recent
financial crisis in 2008. OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría stated:
"... [T]he pain and anguish of the current global economic crisis were
caused by a series of massive failures in the heart of the world's most de-
veloped countries. We are in our current fix because of an excess of finan-
cial innovation, driven by ever-increasing thirst for short-term profit.
Against a background of government support for the expansion of financial
markets, many people turned a blind eye to basic issues of business ethics
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and regulation. We now need to rewrite the rules of finance and global busi-
ness. To restore the trust that is fundamental to functioning markets, we
need better regulation, better supervision, better corporate governance and
better coordination." [FN24]
*358 Even if new and tougher laws were enacted, in an ever more globalising
marketplace where competition is intense, businesses have to innovate, increase
their productivity and take on new risk. [FN25] Laws appear to only catch up
with problems after they have occurred. The deterrent effects are only as ef-
fective as the drafters' ability to predict the future. Besides, Simpson found
that there is little support from various empirical studies that legal sanc-
tions actually made much impact in deterring wrongdoing. [FN26]
Reliance on the market to regulate assumes that it creates a spontaneous or-
der, but markets do fail. Market participants do make erroneous judgments be-
cause of the key assumptions of economics. For example, the assumption that
markets are self-perpetuating where the price mechanism governs demand and sup-
ply is a fallacy because new financial innovation makes it hard to make accur-
ate asset evaluation. Too much pricing is done on future expectations based on
overzealous premises. Risk has become so complex that it is hard to decipher or
differentiate between certain myths and reality. For instance, many economics
and business analysts did not foresee the recent economic crisis. Therefore
markets as a regulatory mechanism can be volatile and unreliable. But this does
not mean that markets have no place in regulating corporations; after all com-
panies are an economic entity. They just have to be incorporated into a broader
regulatory framework in such a manner that promotes efficiency and profitabil-
ity, as well as ensuring that the board is accountable.
This highlights certain inherent weaknesses and limitations of prevailing
regulatory mechanisms and approaches, whether those are rule or market based
mechanisms. The problem is perhaps our over-reliance on rule or market based
governance regime. After all, rules and market solutions assume individuals
will be motivated to comply with a standard set by certain communities or gov-
ernments, or that the self-correcting mechanisms of the market will discourage
people from going astray from market expectations.
Hamilton and Micklethwait found:
"... [A]s we have seen, anytime in the past when there has been a frantic
scramble to be part of the new 'get rich quick' activity, there has eventu-
ally been grief ... [T]here will be another stock market speculative bubble
and there will continue to be corporate failures--most of them small, but a
few spectacular. Greed, overweening ambition and a desire for power will
continue to drive many, in and out of the corporate world." [FN27]
Therefore greed is a key contributing factor in bad governance because self-
interest takes over and decisions are made at the expense of the shareholders'
and other stakeholders' interests. This is consistent with Tricker's observa-
tions:
"... [T]he original concept of the corporations was founded on trust.
Trust was at the heart of capitalist system. Agreements were sealed with a
hand shake. Directors were recognized as reliable stewards of the interests
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of others. Unfortunately, in recent years it has been corruption, crisis,
and corporate collapse that have driven changes in corporate governance
practice. Greed seems to have replaced trust as capitalism's force. Indeed,
the dominant paradigm of corporate governance, agency theory, is rooted in
the belief that people are utility maximizers who need to be controlled be-
cause they cannot be trusted." [FN28]
Why has ethics been neglected? According to Mescher and Howieson:
"... [I]t is noted that a tendency by directors to focus predominately on
their legal duties encourages a form of unreflective 'drowsy morality' in
which directors fail to identify ethical problems until it is too late to
correct them." [FN29]
Consequently, one would query where ethics improve corporate governance? The
short answer is yes; if ethical values can nurture prudence and diligent judg-
ment, then decisions based on ethical criteria would, in theory be more con-
scientious and mindful of other peoples' interests. Francis argued that:
"... [C]orporate governance, as a term, has come to imply good, in the
non-moral as well as moral sense. Its non-moral applications include effi-
cient decision making, appropriate resource allocation, strategic planning,
and so on. In its moral sense good corporate governance has come to be seen
as promoting an ethical climate that is morally appropriate in itself, and
consequently appropriate in that ethical behaviour in business is reflected
in desirable commercial outcomes. Here the links are with due diligence,
directors' duties, and the general tightening of corporate responsibility."
[FN30]
In spite of the benefits, ethics might be a susceptible disciplining tool be-
cause the interpretation of ethical principles is subjective, contextual and
often self-serving. [FN31] Coupled with the lack of the threat of sanctions,
they are often perceived to be, at best, an aspiration.
Nevertheless, ethics can be an effective regulatory tool used in conjunction
with other mechanisms. It is also important to note that this thesis does not
advocate that ethics should substitute for laws or that natural laws should
govern corporations. Ethical principles should therefore play a supporting
role.
In sum, the heart of regulating corporate governance is about restraining
human frailty, delinquency and hubris. In order to achieve good corporate gov-
ernance the combination of regulatory tools like rules, standards, structures,
best practices and ethical principles under an integrated framework might im-
prove accountability and reduce any over-dependency of any one particular regu-
latory tool. Nevertheless, how does one devise such an integrated regulatory
framework?
*359 Pyramid of corporate governance regulation
Law, ethics and governance
At the outset, it is important to note that the law plays a central role in
regulation, because it obliges regulatees to comply under the threat of sanc-
tions. From a sociological perspective, the law could be deemed as a means to
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bring about greater social solidarity, [FN32] especially in complex and differ-
entiated societies. [FN33] Hence law should be a product of social norms and
perhaps vice versa. Social norms are often a product of values system shaped by
many influences across time. Furthermore, laws are effective regulatory mechan-
isms because they oblige regulatees to comply under the threat of sanctions.
The law in its essence is a form of social control to bring about order, as
well as an instrument to shape social/individual behaviour, and resolve dis-
putes. [FN34] The law thus creates duties to give account for one's decisions/
indecisions and actions/inactions. [FN35] The role of law has both facilitative
and expressive dimensions. The former refers to the law as an instrument to
shape social behaviour, whereas the latter institutionalises certain values.
[FN36] These values are not entirely social or political.
The values in laws consist "[n]ot only of statutes and commands but also of
implicit moral principles of justice and integrity". [FN37] For example, natur-
al law theory makes the proposition that ethics or moral values are ingrained
in the law, as "[t]here are universal principles of justice intrinsic to human
nature and human-made law must adhere to them ...". [FN38] However:
"The mere fact that human beings are generally disposed to do certain
things does not make it right ... [T]o say that we do good and avoid evil is
a bit like saying that we ought to do what we ought to do and we ought not
to do what ought not to do." [FN39]
Besides, accountability of individuals might be more obvious, in comparison
with collective accountability. The added complexity of the abrogation of indi-
vidual responsibility, while acting as a group, clouds the analysis. [FN40]
Therefore the debate about ethics and law is a complex one.
Then again, company directors like all agents, individuals and entities have
moral duties and responsibilities beyond the confines of an entity and its mem-
bers. There is a broad social dimension. This does not necessarily suggest that
corporate ethics or ethical leadership mean corporate social responsibilities,
since directors' duties are predominately fiduciary in nature. While the legal
responsibilities could be found in many case laws and statutes, there appears
to be a moral value underpinning this law. This legal doctrine took roots in
moral values that were embedded in Western legal traditions from Judeo-
Christian beliefs from the relationship of trust and confidence or confidential
relations. This is not to say that fiduciary duties are moral or ethical du-
ties, but rather to highlight that moral dimensions are present and inseparable
from legally defined duties.
Similarly, ethical principles are brought into play to advance good gov-
ernance in "soft laws". For example, the OECD Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance states:
"... [T]he board has a key role in setting the ethical tone of a company,
not only by its own actions, but also in appointing and overseeing key exec-
utives and consequently the management in general. High ethical standards
are in the long term interests of the company as a means to make it credible
and trustworthy, not only in day-to-day operations but also with respect to
longer term commitments." [FN41]
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In short, even if the relationship between the law and ethics is a complex one,
since both shape behaviour and influence decision-making, they can be interde-
pendent and mutually supportive. Ethics could legitimise the commands of the
law. The law could bolster ethical values by making them lawful. They are also
complementary, as Francis notes:
"The law commonly sets minimum standards and applies sanctions or resti-
tution from breaches, ethics provides aspirational standards, which invite
creative and flexible quality insights and solutions." [FN42]
The only qualification is that the above propositions vary across countries and
context.
The use of laws and ethics as regulatory tools is an important factor in
designing a broad regulatory framework. The law is an externally imposed rule
and standard of behaviour, whereas ethics is supposed to be value driven. These
values concern what is "right" or "wrong" in human affairs. They can be embed-
ded as norms from psychological imprints and communicated through social inter-
action. The advantage of law is the threat of sanctions and the support of in-
stitutions to oversee the making as well as applications of these rules. The
advantages of ethics are the flexibility, the breadth and scope of instilling
values and the internalisation of values inducing individuals as well as groups
to do the "right" thing. It would appear that law and ethics can complement
each other as regulatory tools since they both compel people to do the "right"
thing. However, it is important to also note that ethics is not strictly speak-
ing a regulatory tool as regulation implies the use of rules, and ethics is not
made up of rules. Instead ethics in this thesis refers to an instrument used to
guide human decisions and behaviour, thus it has a regulatory effect.
Furthermore, the law is meant to have a deterrent effect since breaches at-
tract sanctions, whereas ethics could have a preventive effect. Deterrence dis-
courages action but prevention is keeping things or deeds from happening. If
ethical principles fail to prevent wrongdoing, the law could step in. However,
this is does not mean the regulatees acquiesce in either ethical principles or
legal obligations. An intermediate level of regulatory mechanism has some force
of the law developed by regulatees in the form of self-regulatory codes or
rules enforceable as *360 contractual obligations or membership rules. This
form of regulation is through consensus. Thus a higher level of compliance is
expected. In addition, rules drafted by self-regulatory organisations (SROs)
are more flexible and could incorporate market expectations. However, only a
selected group of people draft the rules. The question is to whom are they ac-
countable? Another issue is enforcement. There is no evidence that these SROs
vigorously enforce their rules.
In spite of this, as discussed, both regulatory tools have limitations. So
the issue is how does one go about organising both tools into a robust regulat-
ory framework? In addition, can laws and ethics work hand in hand to regulate
directors to promote good governance?
According to Farrar the structure of governance is a multitier system (see
Figure 2). While it would appear intuitive as to the workings of the structure
of governance, from a regulatory perspective it lacks detail as to the enforce-
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ability of those ideas, whereas the responsive regulation framework developed
by Ayres and Braithwaite [FN43] used in many business and non-business regulat-
ory frameworks in Australia could be adapted and integrated with Farrar's
structure of governance. The intention of integrating the structure of gov-
ernance and responsive regulation is to offer a more robust regulatory regime
to regulate the directors.
Building blocks of a responsive regulatory framework
The idea of responsive regulation was that regulators should be responsive
to the behaviour of the regulatees in deciding whether to intervene. [FN44]
This is an actor-centred approach to regulation. The most distinctive part is
the use of regulatory pyramid as the centrepiece of this theory. [FN45] The
design was intended to respond to restorative justice, deterrence and incapa-
citate. Each level's theory of compliance is in itself limited and flawed.
[FN46] Braithwaite asserts that "[w]hat the
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
pyramid does is cover the weakness of one theory with the strengths of anoth-
er". [FN47]
Adapting this into the structure of governance, the bottom level of the pyr-
amid should be built on moral values and norms because, as mentioned, greed ap-
pears to be a widespread cause of corporate governance failure. Furthermore,
ethical principles can incorporate diverse ethical principles of different cul-
tures and countries. The next level is co-regulatory instruments; this is where
key stakeholders like interest groups, business groups, associations, business
leaders and others work out a set of rules and a third party is conferred with
regulatory powers to punish those who do not comply with the agreed rules. This
is a form of enforced self-regulation. [FN48] To prevent corruption or capture
by particular group of stakeholders, self-regulatory codes and standards should
be consistent with the law. Since enforcement is an important factor in ensur-
ing compliance, a body or committee should enforce self-regulatory provisions.
[FN49] In addition, a governmental or regulatory body should have oversight,
adding to the force of those codes. If the self-regulatory system fails, the
formulation of those rules should also complement market mechanisms. However,
these rules and regulatory oversight only apply to selective groups of busi-
nesses that voluntarily subscribe to these co-regulatory arrangements. Never-
theless, they might offer a point of reference or exemplar for non-members. At
the apex of the pyramid is the law. The aim of the law is to act as a deterrent
against deviant behaviour and offers a grievance mechanism to redress affected
parties.
The idea of a "three level" regulatory pyramid is to encourage regulatees to
move down or de-escalate to the lowest level, where non-legal regulatory in-
struments are adopted. It is intended to have a persuasive and preventative ef-
fect. Nevertheless, if regulatees fail to comply, then escalation of regulatory
instruments would be applied. At the base level is a non-legal instrument made
up of ethical principles, the next level consists of soft laws and the apex is
black letter laws (see Figure 3).
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The effectiveness of the pyramid of regulation has to be matched by the cor-
responding pyramid of sanctions. [FN50] At the base level, where there is fail-
ure to comply with ethical principles the sanction is the naming and shaming.
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
*361 Reputation is a valuable commodity, shaming will attract certain financial
consequences. [FN51] It is equally important that the ethical principles and
standards reflect the business norms of the country. At the next level the co-
regulatory body could issue warning letters giving the regulatees time to rec-
tify their behaviour. At the extreme is expulsion from membership of associ-
ation or removal of accreditation. Lastly, compensation is a litigatory remedy
for breaches of the law (see Figure 4).
In sum, the underlying goals of a regulatory pyramid with multi-level regu-
latory instruments and sanctions are fourfold [FN52]:
1. To fill the gaps and weaknesses of any single regulatory instrument.
2. To ensure better compliance of regulatory objectives.
3. To encourage regulatees to move to the base of the pyramid where the
objective is to allow regulatees to self-govern and be virtuous actors.
4. To allow for diversity in corporate governance practices between coun-
tries.
Applying this framework of regulatory pyramid to regulating company directors,
the object is to enhance accountability and compliance. At the heart of the
regulation of company directors are general legal duties stipulated in the
black letter law, followed by soft laws like listing codes and guidelines from
influential organisations. The base level will consist of ethical principles.
The idea is only to escalate or move up the enforcement of the regulatory pyr-
amid if the directors fail to carry out their responsibilities, from the mild-
est form of sanction like naming and shaming to the harshest where litigation
is employed to redress grievances of the company. The mid level will be co-
regulatory, with listing rules and directors' association guidelines. This is
where the industry norms and market expectations are incorporated into a parti-
cipatory and communicative regulatory framework. Often ethical principles are
also articulated either directly or indirectly in the guidelines or rules. At
the apex are general duties defined by law. As mentioned, fiduciary duties have
ethical dimensions.
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
Conclusions
The conclusions are as follows. Corporate governance as a concept is a
multi-dimensional and dynamic subject. Deconstructing the board functions with
the objective of enhancing corporate governance offers three core facets. The
first and second could be strengthened through the creation of universal stand-
ards or at least best practices guidelines. While flexibility could be incor-
porated to cater for companies of different sizes and industries, despite some
limitations from transplanting laws from one country to another, relational is-
sues are far more complex; for example, cultural issues. Therefore an effective
system of regulatory framework must be able to offer clear standards where it
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can be adapted across countries on the one hand, while on the other hand, be
able to deal with diverse cultural practices and values. This is made more dif-
ficult in regulating directors because of both individual and collective re-
sponsibilities, as well as country specific norms and values.
Another issue that is crucial in developing and maintaining good governance
is the matter of ethics. Even though ethics is a broad concept and at times
subjective, applying ethics to the board and individual directors is easier
said than done. On the other end of the spectrum, law might be effective in
terms of setting clear standards with the threat of sanctions for non-
compliance. Then again, there are weaknesses; for example, statutes run the
risk of being either under or over inclusive. Besides, the deterrent effect
also has limitations.
For those reasons, adapting a regulatory pyramid to the regulation of com-
pany directors to enhance accountability might be a viable option. Combining
the strengths and the weaknesses of each regulatory tool through the use of a
regulatory pyramid could improve compliance. Furthermore, it possesses the vir-
tues of setting clear standards and incorporating diverse value systems. Cent-
ral to the regulation of company directors are general legal duties stipulated
in the black letter law; thus they should be at the apex of the regulatory pyr-
amid. The next level down is soft laws like listing codes and guidelines de-
veloped in collaboration with local and international organisations. This is
where the industry norms and market expectations are incorporated into a parti-
cipatory and communicative regulatory framework. The base level will consist of
ethical principles. The idea is to only escalate or move up the enforcement of
the regulatory pyramid if the directors fail to carry out their responsibilit-
ies, from the mildest form of sanction like naming and shaming to the harshest
where litigation is employed to redress grievances of the company. Then again,
the proof is in the pudding. The robustness of this idea remains to be tested
in the midst of this recent economic crisis and the endless debate among world
leaders and experts on what needs to done. The ideas canvassed in this article
could be used as a model to integrate hard and soft laws, along with ethical
principles to regulate company directors.
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